Digital Commons @ University of Georgia
School of Law
Scholarly Works

Faculty Scholarship

1-1-2015

The Death of Deference and the Domestication of Treaty Law
Harlan G. Cohen
University of Georgia, hcohen@uga.edu

Repository Citation
Harlan G. Cohen, The Death of Deference and the Domestication of Treaty Law , 2015 BYU L. Rev. 1467
(2015),
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/fac_artchop/1074

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Digital Commons @ University
of Georgia School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Scholarly Works by an authorized administrator of
Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law. Please share how you have benefited from this access
For more information, please contact tstriepe@uga.edu.

1.COHEN.FIN (DO NOT DELETE)

5/6/2016 7:33 AM

The Death of Deference and the Domestication of
Treaty Law
Harlan Grant Cohen*
I. INTRODUCTION
According to Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of
the United States, “Courts in the United States have final authority
to interpret an international agreement for the purposes of applying
it as law in the United States, but will give great weight to an
interpretation made by the executive branch.” 1 Such “great weight”
or deference reflects a common wisdom that the president plays a
special constitutional role with regard to treaties. The president
negotiates treaty terms and is thought to have special knowledge as
to their meaning to the parties. The president knows what
interpretations will best forward U.S. interests in the world. The
president directs foreign relations with the United States’ treaty
counterparties and has insight into both how they interpret these
provisions and how they might react to various interpretations
adopted by the United States. And it is the president and the
executive branch that deal with the fallout from any U.S.
interpretation with which other treaty parties disagree. In these
regards, deference to the executive in treaty interpretation fits within
a broader picture of deference to the executive in U.S. foreign
relations law more generally. 2 According to conventional wisdom,
dealing with foreign states requires special expertise, discretion,
flexibility, and speed that militate in favor of presidential dominance

* Associate Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law. Thank you to the
participants in the BYU Law Review Symposium on Treaty Law and Pamela Bookman for their
helpful comments and insights and to Gary Ashcroft, Jena Emory, Morganne Patterson,
Christopher Shaun Polston, Dov Preminger, and Tyler Washburn for invaluable
research assistance.
1. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 326(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1987).
2. See Harlan Grant Cohen, Formalism and Distrust: Foreign Affairs Law in the
Roberts Court, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 380, 386–87 (2015) (describing the
conventional wisdom).
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over foreign relations and special forbearance to the executive in
interpreting and applying foreign relations law. 3 When it comes to
foreign relations, “Let the president do his job” becomes a common
legal refrain.
But recent cases question whether this picture still reflects the
reality of foreign relations law and whether the Restatement’s
assessment is still accurate. In response to the government’s
interpretation of a treaty in one case, the Supreme Court responded
simply: “That reasoning is erroneous.” 4 In another, the Court
explained that, “while we respect the Government’s views about the
proper interpretation of treaties . . . we have been unable to find any
other authority or precedent” 5 suggesting their view is correct. And
during oral arguments in a third treaty-interpretation case, the
Solicitor General was asked by a Justice, “[I]s there any possibility
that there is any other country in the world that has the slightest
interest in how the United States or any of its subdivisions deals with
the particular situation that’s involved in this case?” 6 At least in these
cases, the Court seems less than deferential to the executive branch’s
views. Whatever weight the Court is giving them, it certainly seems
less than “great.” 7
At the same time, the Court seems to be domesticating the
questions presented in treaty cases. Rather than focusing on the
treaty and what its terms might mean in relations between the
United States and others, the Court has been turning the question
inward, focusing on implementing legislation, congressional intent,
and ordinary methods of statutory interpretation. The effect of this
trend is to reinforce the trend away from deference; by presenting
the question as one of domestic lawmaking rather than of foreign
relations, the Court disintegrates the arguments for executive

3. Id.; see also Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076 (2015).
4. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 630 (2006).
5. BG Grp., PLC v. Argentina, 134 S. Ct. 1198, 1208 (2014) (“We do not accept the
Solicitor General’s view as applied to the treaty before us.”).
6. Transcript of Oral Argument at 17, Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014)
(No. 12–158).
7. Though admittedly, as Jean Galbraith points out in her contribution to this
symposium, there has long been questions as to exactly how much weight “great weight”
implied. Jean Galbraith, What Should the Restatement (Fourth) Say About Treaty
Interpretation?, 2015 BYU L. REV. 1499, 1502–03 (2016).
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interpretative primacy, while underlining arguments for the
Court’s own.
This reasoning from recent treaty cases, while seemingly out of
step with prior practice and the Restatement (Third), fits well with
broader trends in foreign relations law jurisprudence from the
United States Supreme Court headed by Chief Justice John Roberts.
Elsewhere, 8 I have argued that (over the past ten years) the Roberts
Court has been methodically whittling away the deference it
traditionally granted to political branches in foreign relations by: (1)
tightening its control over treaty interpretation in cases like Hamdan
v. Rumsfeld, 9 Bond v. United States, 10 and BG Group, PLC v.
Argentina; 11 (2) limiting the president’s ability to override state laws
in Medellín v. Texas 12 and to act without Congress in Hamdan and
Medellín; (3) rejecting the president’s construction of foreign
relations statutes in Hamdan, Bond, and Argentina v. NML Capital,
Ltd.; 13 and (4) increasing the Court’s oversight over foreign relations
by shrinking the scope of the political-question doctrine in Zivotofsky
v. Clinton (Zivotofsky I). 14
Ten years into the Roberts Court, 15 the timeworn cliché that
foreign affairs are different may simply no longer be valid. This may
be the result of a backlash against perceived overreaching by the
executive, a realization that globalization imbues even the most
mundane of affairs with foreign affairs implications, a shift in the
politics of the members of the Court, or a long-fused reckoning with
the end of the Cold War. 16 But even after a strongly deferential and

8. Cohen, supra note 2.
9. 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
10. 134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014).
11. 134 S. Ct. 1198, 1208 (2014).
12. 552 U.S. 491 (2008).
13. 134 S. Ct. 2250, 2258 (2014) (noting that “Argentina and the United States urge
us to consider the worrisome international-relations consequences of siding with the lower
court,” but concluding that “[t]hese apprehensions are better directed to” Congress).
14. 132 S. Ct. 1421 (2012).
15. Cohen, supra note 2, at 436–37.
16. See Peter J. Spiro, Globalization and the (Foreign Affairs) Constitution, 63 OHIO
ST. L.J. 649, 652–53, 713 (2002) (prophesying that in a plurilateral, post–Cold War world,
the Court would start to pull back on its traditional deference to the executive branch).
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pro-presidential opinion in Zivotofsky v. Kerry (Zivotofsky II), 17
skepticism seems to be winning over deference most of the time.
This Article explores how this broader trend has played out with
regard to treaty interpretation. It also examines the treaty cases of
the past ten years and compares them to the prior patterns described
by the Restatement (Third).
Part II looks at deference to the executive branch’s treaty
interpretations. It puts the anecdotal evidence of diminishing
deference in context by developing a complete data set of the
Roberts Court treaty interpretation cases that can be compared to
such sets from prior Courts. This data set suggests a significant shift
at the Supreme Court; given how rarely the Court follows the
executive’s views on the meaning of treaties, it might be fair to say
that the Court does not defer at all.
Part III looks at how the Court has reframed treaty questions,
focusing, where possible, on domestic rather than international
sources. The effect of this trend has been to sideline the president,
increasing the Court’s interpretative authority at the expense of
the executive.
Part IV contemplates the current and future status of the “great
weight” standard. Looking more closely at the treaty jurisprudence
of the Courts of Appeals over the span of the Roberts Court, Part IV
finds no evidence that the Supreme Court’s newfound skepticism of
the executive branch’s treaty interpretations has caught on among
lower courts. On the contrary, a new data set of the Circuit Courts’
treaty interpretations reveals that the Courts of Appeal still adopt the
executive branch’s view the grand majority of the time. Should the
Circuit Courts change their approach in light of the Roberts Court
shifts? How should the Restatement (Fourth) approach deference to
the executive branch in treaty interpretation?
Part IV then considers the possible routes for the Restatement
(Fourth) of the Foreign Relations Law and whether a new doctrinal
approach to treaty interpretation may be in order. The end goal is a
doctrine of treaty interpretation that balances the courts’ authority
“to say what the law is” 18 with the executive branch’s expertise on
treaties and their meaning, while also leaving space for the president
17.
18.

1470
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Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
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to articulate policies in U.S. relations with treaty partners and other
states. The question is whether there is a doctrinal framework that
can describe and harness the Roberts Court’s trends while fulfilling
the United States’ varied goals in applying treaties. Part IV ends by
suggesting that a “normalization” 19 of treaty deference may be the
best way to channel current trends into a positive doctrinal direction.
II. WEIGHING EXECUTIVE BRANCH VIEWS
A. Treaty Deference Trends
Courts have not always deferred to the executive branch’s
interpretation of treaties. In fact, in the early years of the Republic,
the Court seemed to do quite the opposite. 20 Nevertheless, over the
past century, a doctrine, or perhaps doctrines, of deference to
executive treaty interpretations has gained force, ultimately achieving
recognition in the Restatement (Third)’s determination that the
executive branch’s interpretation was to be given “great weight.” 21
Two different paths led to this doctrine. 22 One path drew upon
the executive branch’s interpretations as evidence of the intent of the
treaty framers. 23 The executive branch’s interpretation deserved
weight because the executive was involved in the negotiations and
knew what the parties intended. The executive branch had no special
power over treaty interpretation—it was for the courts to finally
interpret the law—but the executive branch’s views were strong and
useful evidence of the most accurate reading of the treaty’s terms.
A second path produced a true deference doctrine. 24 Cases on
this path suggested that the executive should have some authority

19. See Ganesh Sitaraman & Ingrid Wuerth, The Normalization of Foreign Relations
Law, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1897, 1970 (2015).
20. See David Sloss, Judicial Deference to Executive Branch Treaty Interpretations: A
Historical Perspective, 62 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 497, 506–07 (2007) (describing early
nineteenth century cases).
21. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 326(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1987).
22. See Robert M. Chesney, Disaggregating Deference: The Judicial Power and Executive
Treaty Interpretations, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1723, 1741–44 (2007) (describing the two paths).
23. Id. Chesney points to In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453, 468 (1891) and Nielsen v. Johnson,
279 U.S. 47, 52 (1929) as the primary cases in this line.
24. Chesney, supra note 22, at 1741–44 (describing Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447,
468 (1913) and Sullivan v. Kidd, 254 U.S. 433, 442 (1921)).

1471

1.COHEN.FIN (DO NOT DELETE)

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

5/6/2016 7:33 AM

2015

over treaty interpretation that the courts should properly recognize.
This path drew on traditional arguments for executive prerogative,
like executive control of foreign affairs 25 and the need for one
voice, 26 the executive’s involvement in everyday treaty interpretation,
the need for flexibility in dealing with foreign states, the president’s
political accountability with regard to foreign affairs, 27 and the
executive branch’s expertise in foreign policy. Gradually over time,
the second justification crowded out the former. 28
The dominance of this deference model was suggested by
empirical studies. In a study of the twenty-three treaty interpretation
cases from the Warren, Burger, and Rehnquist eras, David Bederman
found that the Court followed the executive’s interpretation in
nineteen of twenty-three cases, or roughly 83% of the time. 29
Looking solely at treaty interpretation cases from the beginning of
the Rehnquist Court until 1993, the percentage grew even higher.
The Rehnquist Court adopted the executive branch’s view in nine of
ten cases, or 90% of the time. 30 Robert Chesney later updated and
expanded the study to include treaty interpretation cases from 1984
through 2005 at both the Supreme Court and the lower federal
courts. 31 Chesney found that in sixty-seven treaty interpretation
cases, the executive prevailed fifty-three times, or 79% of the time. 32
Of the remaining fourteen cases, four were inconclusive. And of the
ten cases that did not follow the executive, four were later reversed
on appeal. 33 If those four cases are excluded, the executive’s win-rate
goes up to 84%. If one excludes the inconclusive cases, that win-rate
rises to 90%.
What do these percentages signify? How much deference do they
suggest? It’s hard to tell. There are many reasons a court might
25. See Scott M. Sullivan, Rethinking Treaty Interpretation, 86 TEX. L. REV. 777, 792 (2008).
26. Cf. Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2085–86 (2015)
(wielding “one voice” justification to give the president exclusive control over issues related to
recognition of states and governments).
27. Tim Wu, Treaties’ Domains, 93 VA. L. REV. 571, 591 (2007).
28. Chesney, supra note 22, at 1744–48.
29. David J. Bederman, Revivalist Canons and Treaty Interpretation, 41 UCLA L. REV.
953, 975 n.108, 1015–16 n.422 (1994).
30. Id. at 975 n.108.
31. Chesney, supra note 22, at 1752–58.
32. Id. at 1755.
33. Id.

1472

1.COHEN.FIN (DO NOT DELETE)

1467

5/6/2016 7:33 AM

The Death of Deference

adopt the same interpretation as the executive. In particular, the
executive does have the best knowledge of the treaty negotiations,
and its proffered interpretation may simply be right or, at least, the
most reasonable. The raw numbers cannot distinguish cases in which
the court agrees with the executive from cases in which the court simply
follows the executive regardless of, or even in spite of, its own view.
Looking at how often the courts follow the executive in other
cases can provide a helpful baseline. In a 2008 study, William
Eskridge and Lauren Baer looked at cases involving either Chevron 34
or Skidmore 35 deference, the two prominent standards for deference
to administrative agency decisions. 36 They found that from 1989 to
2005, the courts adopted the same view as the administrative agency
76.2% of the time when applying the test from Chevron and 73.5% of
the time when applying the test from Skidmore. 37 In a different study
from 2006, Thomas Miles and Cass Sunstein found that, from 1989
to 2005, the Supreme Court and circuit courts adopted the same
view as the agency 67% of the time and 64% of the time
respectively. 38 By any standard, Chevron sets out a pretty deferential
test: under Chevron, the court is supposed to defer to any reasonable
agency interpretation. 39 And yet the rates of agreement between the
courts and the executive in those cases pale in comparison to the
rates of agreement on treaty interpretation. Perhaps the executive is
more likely to be correct in its interpretation of a treaty than a
statute. Perhaps the potential reactions of other nations discipline the
executive more than Congress does, making unreasonable treaty
interpretations less likely than unreasonable agency interpretations of
statutes. Both are, at the very least, debatable propositions. But the
high numbers for treaties are at least suggestive that the courts were
in fact giving the executive’s views on treaties “great weight.” As

34. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
35. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
36. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001) (describing the relationship
between the two tests).
37. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme
Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J.
1083, 1099, 1125 (2008).
38. Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An
Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 849 (2006).
39. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844.
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David Bederman put it, deference to the executive is “the single best
predictor of interpretive outcomes in American treaty cases.” 40
But then along came the Roberts Court. Hamdan was the first
case to raise eyebrows and indicate that something might be
changing. 41 Hamdan involved the proper interpretation of Common
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. 42 The question was whether
the conflict with Al-Qaeda was “not of an international character,” 43
and thus covered by the treaty provision. The executive branch took
the view that, because the conflict with Al-Qaeda was taking place all
over the world, it was of an international character. 44 The majority of
the Court didn’t just reject the executive branch’s view; it rejected it
out of hand. Interpreting Common Article 3 to cover any conflict
not between two states, Justice Stevens described the executive
branch’s view simply as “erroneous.” 45 No mention was made of
deference, of great weight, or of respect for the executive
branch’s view.
That decision in Hamdan, though, came one day after the Court
cited the “great weight” standard and adopted the executive
branch’s interpretation of the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations (VCCR) over that of the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) in Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon. 46 And in other cases, particularly
those interpreting the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of
International Child Abduction (“Hague Convention”), the Court
has followed the executive branch’s interpretation. 47 One case might
have been only an anomaly.

40. Bederman, supra note 29, at 1015.
41. See, e.g., Chesney, supra note 22, at 1726–27, 1729–33; Sullivan, supra note 25, at 782.
42. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 630 (2006).
43. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12,
1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
44. See Memorandum from President George W. Bush, to the Vice President, et al., on
Humane Treatment of Al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees (Feb. 7, 2002) at ¶ 2.c, reprinted in
THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB 134–35 (Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua L.
Dratel eds., 2005).
45. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 630. It is possible that Justice Stevens was suggesting a new
“clearly erroneous” standard. He does not say so clearly though, nor does he explain how it
relates to the prior “great weight” standard. Thanks to Pamela Bookman for the point.
46. 548 U.S. 331, 355 (2006).
47. See, e.g., Lozano v. Alvarez, 134 S. Ct. 1224 (2014); Chafin v. Chafin, 133 S. Ct.
1017 (2013); Abbott v. Abbott, 560 U.S. 1 (2010). Notably though, Justice Stevens, joined in
his dissent in Abbott by Justices Thomas and Breyer, questioned whether the executive
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The 2013 term gave Hamdan some company. While agreeing
with the executive’s interpretation of the Hague Convention in
Lozano, the Court summarily brushed aside the executive branch’s
interpretation of the United Kingdom-Argentina Bilateral Investment
Treaty (“BIT”) in BG Group and the Government’s position on the
requirements of the Chemical Weapons Convention in Bond.
The Court’s reaction to the executive branch’s interpretation of
the United Kingdom-Argentina BIT in BG Group is telling. “While
we respect the Government’s views about the proper interpretation
of treaties,” the Court explained, “we have been unable to find any
other authority or precedent” 48 supporting its view. Unconvinced,
the Court “d[id] not accept the Solicitor General’s view as applied to
th[is] treaty . . . .” 49
B. Examining the Roberts Court Data
Anecdotally then, it seems that the Court may no longer be
weighing the executive branch’s view of treaties as heavily. This
impression is supported by a more careful analysis of the data.
A close search of the cases reveals that between 2005 and 2015
(i.e., the Roberts Court era to date) there have been twelve cases
involving treaties. Ten of those required at least some interpretation
of a treaty. 50 Of those cases, the Court has agreed with the executive
in five or six cases. 51 Three of these five or six cases in which the

branch’s view of the Hague Convention really was due to “great weight” in that case,
accepting a much narrower range of circumstances in which such deference would be
warranted. Abbott, 560 U.S. at 41–43 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
48. BG Grp., PLC v. Argentina, 134 S. Ct. 1198, 1209 (2014).
49. Id. at 1208.
50. Two of the twelve, Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511 (2009), and Golan v. Holder,
132 S. Ct. 873 (2012), ended up turning on something other than the treaty in question. In
Negusie, the Court held that the Board of Immigration Appeals had wrongly relied on a prior
Court decision, Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U. S. 490 (1981), and remanded the question
to the agency for reconsideration. The Court thus never considered the meaning of the
underlying treaties, the 1967 United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees and
the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. 555 U.S. at 522–23.
In Golan, the Government argued that extension of the copyright term for foreign works was
justified by U.S. obligations under the Berne Convention. In the end though, no provision of
the Berne Convention was really in question and nothing turned on its interpretation. 132 S.
Ct. at 884–94.
51. Medellín seems best counted as a partial victory and a partial defeat. See discussion
infra notes 69–71 and accompanying text.
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Court agreed with the executive (Abbott v. Abbott, 52 Chafin v.
Chafin, 53 and Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez 54) involve interpretation of
one treaty, the Hague Convention. As previously mentioned, the
Court also sided with the executive branch rather than the ICJ in
interpreting the in Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon. 55 And the Court
agreed with the executive branch in Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita
Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, in which the executive branch argued
that hoasca, a hallucinogenic tea, was covered by the 1971 U.N.
Convention on Psychotropic Substances. 56 The Court parted with
the executive in that case though on the effect of that interpretation,
holding that United States’ obligations under the treaty alone could
not serve as a justification for refusing a religious exemption for
hoasca use under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 57 a
different trend that I will come back to in Part III.
The Court, on the other hand, parted ways with the executive in
Hamdan, dismissing the executive branch’s view of the Geneva
Conventions, 58 and BG Group, rejecting the executive branch’s
construction of the United Kingdom-Argentina BIT and largely
brushing aside its concern about how similar language used in U.S.
BITs might be interpreted by other courts. 59 In Permanent Mission
of India to the United Nations v. City of New York, 60 the Court fails
to even mention that the Solicitor General had submitted a brief 61
urging a different interpretation of the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations than the one eventually adopted. 62 Bond is a bit
harder to categorize. The Solicitor General argued that the Chemical

52. 560 U.S. 1 (2010).
53. 133 S. Ct. 1017 (2013).
54. 134 S. Ct. 1224 (2014).
55. 548 U.S. 331, 345–50 (2006).
56. 546 U.S. 418, 422 (2005).
57. Id.
58. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 630 (2006).
59. BG Grp., PLC v. Argentina, 134 S. Ct. 1198, 1208–09 (2014). Justice Sotomayor,
in her concurrence, does leave some space for a different result regarding the language in U.S.
BITs. Id. at 1213–15 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
60. 551 U.S. 193 (2007).
61. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 26–27,
Permanent Mission of India to the U.N. v. City of New York, 551 U.S. 193 (2007)
(No. 06 134).
62. 551 U.S. at 201–02.
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Weapons Convention prohibited the use of toxic chemicals “under
any circumstances” not permitted by the Convention and required
the United States to criminalize Carol Anne Bond’s attempted
poisoning of her neighbor. 63 Chief Justice Roberts attempts to avoid
interpreting the Convention in his majority opinion, 64 instead
applying a presumption to the interpretation of the statute
implementing the Convention. That said, after summarizing the
history of the Convention, the Chief Justice initially suggests that
the Convention would not have been understood to cover entirely
local conduct like Bond’s attempted poisoning. “The Convention, a
product of years of worldwide study, analysis, and multinational
negotiation, arose in response to war crimes and acts of terrorism,” 65
the Chief Justice writes. “There is no reason to think the sovereign
nations that ratified the Convention were interested in anything like
Bond’s common law assault.” 66 And while the interpretation that
follows is of the statute rather than the treaty, the Court’s
understanding of the treaty and its purposes clearly buttresses the
majority’s view that “chemical weapons” as commonly understood,
and as understood by the treaty’s drafters, 67 does not normally
include simple poisonings. 68 Whether relying on that view or not,
the Court is clearly not deferring to the president’s interpretation of
the Convention.
Medellín is the most complicated case to categorize. In his brief,
the Solicitor General argued that according to their terms, neither
the Optional Protocol to the VCCR nor the U.N. Charter is
privately enforceable in U.S. Courts. 69 Instead, “[t]he Optional
Protocol and the U.N. Charter create an obligation to comply with

63. Brief for the United States at 2, Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014)
(No. 12-158).
64. Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2088 (“Fortunately, we have no need to interpret the scope of
the Convention in this case.”).
65. Id. at 2087.
66. Id.
67. Id. (quoting Ian R. Kenyon, Why We Need a Chemical Weapons Convention and an
OPCW, in THE CREATION OF THE ORGANISATION FOR THE PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL
WEAPONS 1, 17 (Ian R. Kenyon & Daniel Feakes eds., 2007)).
68. See also Galbraith, supra note 7, at 1517 (observing that “the Court spends a great
deal of effort in describing and interpreting the Chemical Weapons Convention itself”).
69. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 27–30,
Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008) (No. 06-984).
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[the ICJ’s judgment in] Avena, and those treaties implicitly give the
President authority to implement that treaty-based obligation on
behalf of the Nation.” 70 While the Court agreed with the former
proposition, it went further than the government on the latter.
Adopting a reading of the U.N. Charter’s “undertakes to comply”
language nowhere suggested by the Solicitor General, the Court
found the obligation to follow ICJ judgments non-self-executing
and as such subject to implementation by Congress rather than the
president alone. 71 Depending on how we count it, Medellín could be
categorized either with those cases in which the Court defers or
those in which it does not. The best reading, I would suggest, is as a
partial victory for the executive branch, bringing the count of cases
in which the Roberts Court failed to defer to 4.5 out of 10. The
Roberts Court’s rate of agreement with the executive would stand at
55% and would still only be 60% even if Medellín is counted entirely
among the executive’s victories.
Beyond the high rate of disagreement (and perhaps even more
tellingly), the Court mentions a standard of deference to the
executive (the Restatement rule) in only four of the ten treaty
interpretation cases, 72 and in two of those four, the Court specifically
chooses not to defer. 73 The deference standard appears almost as an
excuse for failing to defer in a particular case, an implicit suggestion
that the case is merely an outlier and not a threat to the general rule.
70. Id. at 11.
71. Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 508 (2008).
72. See id. at 513 (“[T]he United States’ interpretation of a treaty ‘is entitled to great
weight.’” (quoting Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avangliano, 457 U.S. 176, 184–85 (1982)));
Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 355 (2006) (“[W]hile courts interpret treaties for
themselves, the meaning given them by the departments of government particularly charged
with their negotiation and enforcement is given great weight.” (quoting Kolovrat v. Oregon,
366 U.S. 187, 194 (1961))); Abbott v. Abbott, 560 U.S. 1, 15 (2010) (“[T]he Executive
Branch’s interpretation of a treaty ‘is entitled to great weight.’” (quoting Sumimoto Shoji Am.,
457 U.S. at 185)); BG Grp., PLC v. Argentina, 134 S. Ct. 1198, 1209 (“[W]e respect the
Government’s views about the proper interpretation of treaties.”).
73. See Medellín, 552 U.S. at 525 (“The United States maintains that . . . . the relevant
treaties . . . ‘implicitly give the President authority to implement that treaty-based obligation’ .
. . . We disagree.”) (quoting Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioner at 11, Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008) (No. 06-984)); BG Grp., 134 S. Ct.
at 1209 (“[W]hile we respect the Government’s views about the proper interpretation of
treaties, we have been unable to find any other authority or precedent suggesting that the use
of the ‘consent’ label in a treaty should make a critical difference in discerning the
parties’ intent.”).
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Disagreements with the executive branch are also spread broadly
across the Court. Executive branch interpretations have been
rejected by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Stevens, Breyer, and
Thomas. Additionally, the Court rejected the executive branch’s view
in cases in which it appeared as party (Hamdan and Bond) and
amicus (Permanent Mission of India and BG Group).
C. Deference’s Slow Death?
What’s going on here? Over the years, scholars have put forward
any number of suggestions on how the deference standard for treaty
interpretation could or should be tailored. Can these cases be
reconciled with one of them? The suggestion made in the reporters’
notes to the Restatement (Third) seems to be an imperfect fit. 74 The
reporters’ notes explain that the Court is
more likely to defer to an Executive interpretation previously made
in diplomatic negotiation with other countries, on the ground that
the United States should speak with one voice, than to one
adopted by the Executive in relation to a case before the courts,
especially where individual rights or interests are involved. 75

The Roberts Court, though, has been following the executive
branch in precisely those cases involving private interests, specifically,
the Hague Convention cases, 76 while diplomacy and negotiationbased arguments in BG Group and Bond have fallen on deaf ears. 77
An argument could be made that the government’s interpretations in
74. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 326 reporters’ note 2 (AM. LAW INST. 1987).
75. Id.
76. See Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez, 134 S. Ct. 1224, 1228 (2014) (examining whether
a time period in the Hague Convention was “subject to equitable tolling when the abducting
parent conceal[ed] the child’s location from the other parent”); Chafin v. Chafin, 133 S. Ct.
1017, 1021 (2013) (considering whether, after a child was returned to her country of habitual
residence pursuant to an order issued under the requirements of the Hague Convention, an
appeal of the order was moot); Abbott, 560 U.S. at 5 (examining “whether a parent has a
‘righ[t] of custody’ by reason of that parent’s ne exeat right: the authority to consent before
the other parent may take the child to another country”).
77. See BG Grp., 134 S. Ct. at 1208 (rejecting Solicitor General’s argument that a local
litigation provision may have been “a condition on the State’s consent to enter into an
arbitration agreement”); Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2087 (2014) (dismissing the
government’s argument that an adverse holding would “undermine confidence in the United
States as an international treaty partner”).
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Hamdan, BG Group, and Bond, at least, were mere litigating
positions. In particular, some have viewed the executive branch’s
positions on the Geneva Conventions, 78 the U.K.-Argentina BIT, 79
and the Chemical Weapons Convention 80 as unprincipled and
perhaps opportunistic. It is hardly clear though that that was true in
those cases, and the Court gives little to hint that it was part of
their reasoning.
Others have suggested that the deference standard had been
softened in an earlier case, El Al Israel Airlines v. Tsui Yuan Tseng. 81
That decision cited the “great weight” standard, but further
explained that “[r]espect is ordinarily due the reasonable views of the
executive branch concerning the meaning of an international
treaty.” 82 To some observers, this standard sounded like a retreat to
something similar to Chevron or even Skidmore deference. 83 Under
this standard, only “reasonable views of the executive branch” need
be considered, and those are due only “respect.” In his previously
mentioned study, Robert Chesney tried to examine whether El Al
really was a turning point, specifically whether courts had been any
less deferential afterwards than they had been before. 84 He found
little difference, noting that the courts agreed with the executive
branch in twenty-nine of thirty-four cases (or 85%) before El Al and
twenty-three of twenty-eight (or 82%) afterwards. 85 Still, more time
has passed since El Al, and perhaps its effects have only now fully
sunk in. Perhaps the Court’s view in Hamdan, Bond, BG Group, and
Permanent Mission of India is that the executive branch’s
78. See, e.g., John Cerone, Making Sense of the U.S. President’s Intervention in Medellín,
31 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 279, 295 (2008) (describing the executive’s invocation of
international law as “opportunistic”).
79. See, e.g., Anthea Roberts & Christina Trahanas, Judicial Review of Investment Treaty
Awards: BG Group v. Argentina, 108 AM. J. INT’L L. 750, 762 (2014) (explaining that the
U.S. Government sought to “draw a line that looked ad hoc and self-serving”).
80. See, e.g., Julian Ku, A Quick Reaction to Oral Argument in Bond v. U.S.: Missouri v.
Holland is in Real Trouble, OPINIO JURIS (Nov. 5, 2013, 2:14 PM),
http://opiniojuris.org/2013/11/05/quick-reaction-oral-argument-bond-v-u-s-missouri-vholland-real-trouble/.
81. 525 U.S. 155 (1999).
82. Id. at 168.
83. See, e.g., Joshua Weiss, Defining Executive Deference in Treaty Interpretation Cases,
79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1592, 1594–95 (2011).
84. Chesney, supra note 22, at 1756–58.
85. Id.
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interpretation in each is simply unreasonable and unworthy of
respect. No mention, however, is made of either El Al or its
potential new standard.
These are just two possible doctrinal suggestions. The scholarly
literature offers a full spectrum of possible treaty interpretation
deference standards, 86 with advocates for total deference to executive
branch views, 87 Chevron, 88 Skidmore, 89 sliding-scales of deference
based on other available evidence of a treaty’s meaning, 90 and almost
no deference at all. 91 Scholars have suggested granting more
deference on bilateral foreign policy issues and less on issues between
private parties, 92 distinguishing cases based on whether the
interpretation reflects a consistent internal policy or a one-time
litigating position, 93 or that deference be denied the executive in
cases determining the scope of the executive’s own authority. 94 This
Article could, with some finessing, try to reconcile the Roberts
Court opinions with any number of these proposals.
But this discussion of potential deference standards misses the
forest for the trees. The Roberts Court trend away from deference is
stark, particularly in comparison to the trend towards greater
deference that came before. One should, of course, be careful not to
make too much of the numbers. This data on the Roberts Court is a
very small sample and these cases may not be representative. For
example, cases of executive overreach may have been more likely to

86. See id. at 1759–71 (collecting and describing proposals); Weiss, supra note 83, at
1600–07 (same).
87. John Yoo, Politics as Law?: The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the Separation of
Powers, and Treaty Interpretation, 89 CAL. L. REV. 851, 864–82 (2001).
88. Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Chevronizing Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE
L. J. 1170 (2007); Curtis A. Bradley, Chevron Deference and Foreign Affairs, 86 VA. L. REV.
649, 650 (2000).
89. Evan Criddle, Comment, Chevron Deference and Treaty Interpretation, 112 YALE
L.J. 1927, 1928–34 (2003).
90. Michael P. Van Alstine, The Death of Good Faith in Treaty Jurisprudence and a Call
for Resurrection, 93 GEO. L.J. 1885, 1942–43 (2005); Weiss, supra note 86, at 1607–12.
91. Alex Glashausser, Difference and Deference in Treaty Interpretation, 50 VILL. L.
REV. 25, 27 (2005).
92. Van Alstine, supra note 90.
93. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 326 reporters’ notes 2 (AM. LAW INST. 1987).
94. Ganesh Sitaraman & Ingrid Wuerth, The Normalization of Foreign Relations Law,
128 HARV. L. REV. 1897, 1970 (2015).
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reach the Supreme Court (perhaps the Court is more likely to grant
certiorari in such cases), something the circuit courts’ much higher
rate of agreement with the executive might suggest. 95 But that was
not the pattern in the past; Bederman found a 90% rate of agreement
between the Rehnquist Court and the executive branch. 96 Perhaps
the Roberts Court is uniquely on the lookout for such cases of
overreach in deciding whether to grant certiorari. That said, a 55 to
60% rate of agreement still seems very low. Moreover, 55 to 60%
probably overstates the amount of deference the Court is granting.
In a number of the cases decided in favor of the executive, the result
seems over-determined, with all of the other evidence of the treaty’s
proper meaning pointing in the same direction as that suggested by
the executive branch. 97 It is hard to find a case in which the Court
truly defers, adopting an interpretation despite some inclination in
another direction. Moreover, we should expect the Court and the
executive to agree on treaty interpretation much of the time. They
are both looking at the same evidence, including evidence of what
other treaty parties think the treaty means. We might expect that
even in the absence of any knowledge of the executive branch’s view
of a treaty, the Court would adopt the same view as the executive at
least half the time. 98

95. See infra Part IV.
96. See Bederman, supra note 29, at 975 n.108, 1015–16 n.422.
97. See, e.g, Abbott v. Abbott, 560 U.S. 1, 10–15 (2010) (laying out the Court’s
independent analysis of the treaty); id. at 16 (adding that “[t]his Court’s conclusion that ne
exeat rights are rights of custody is further informed by the views of other contracting states”);
id. at 20 (explaining that the Court’s view also “accords with [the treaty’s] objects and
purposes”); Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 354 (2006) (first adopting an
interpretation of the ICJ Statute, and then, finding the view of the executive branch to be in
accord); id. at 347–50 (interpreting the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations directly,
without reference to the executive branch’s view); id. at 356 (“Bustillo points to nothing in
the drafting history of Article 36 or in the contemporary practice of other signatories that
undermines this conclusion.”).
98. The counterargument would be that the executive has incentives to interpret
treaties to accord with its policy goals rather than objective evidence of the treaty’s meaning.
That is certainly true in some cases, and one might have intuitions that it would be the case in
more. But the United States does not always appear as a party (rather than amicus), and in the
absence of evidence of an ulterior motive, we might assume that the strongest, general interest
of the United States is in adopting an interpretation that will carry the fewest repercussions
with our treaty counterparties. Of course, a different way of putting all of this is that what is
surprising is not that the Roberts Court so often disagrees with the executive, but that the
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At 55 to 60%, it looks like the “great weight” standard, while
still peaking over the water from time to time, is sinking. In contrast
to the prior period, executive branch views now seem poor
predictors of what the Court will actually decide. In fact, it begins to
look as though the Court is granting the executive branch no
deference at all in the interpretation of treaties.
Descriptively, we seem to be returning to the “evidence of
intent” or persuasiveness model, in which the executive branch’s
views are valued mostly for their ability to help unravel what treaty
provisions actually mean. They are not given special authority above
and beyond their persuasiveness. And normatively, this might be the
right move to reign in executive overreaching at precisely a time
when the number of policy issues covered by treaty obligations, e.g.,
local murder 99 and attempted murder, 100 seem to be expanding. But
as evidenced in BG Group, the cost of this move is that it may ignore
executive branch positions that are not built on the intent of the
treaty drafters—in that case the drafters were the United Kingdom
and Argentina—but instead on carefully considered foreign policy
positions of the United States. 101
III. DOMESTICATING TREATY QUESTIONS
The Court’s control over treaty interpretation during the
Roberts Court era has been reinforced by a second trend:
domestication. Increasingly, the Court seems to be working to
assimilate treaty interpretation questions into more traditional
domestic-constitutional, statutory, or contract ones.
Some observers have worried that the Court may be turning in
some treaty interpretation cases to domestic rather than international
standards of interpretation. Such a trend could be dangerous, these
observers worry, if the Court begins to interpret treaty obligations
differently from other nations. The Court’s use of traditional U.S.
executive’s interpretation has so often diverged from the objective evidence of the treaty’s
meaning. Such a trend might very well explain the trend towards less deference.
99. See Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008).
100. See Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014).
101. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. The Solicitor General had argued that
the language of the U.K.-Argentina BIT was similar to language the United States had used in
its own BIT and that the United States interpreted in specific ways. BG Grp., PLC v.
Argentina, 134 S. Ct. 1189, 1209–10 (2014).

1483

1.COHEN.FIN (DO NOT DELETE)

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

5/6/2016 7:33 AM

2015

contract law principles to interpret the U.K.-Argentina BIT in BG
Group102 and its application of a presumption of federalism or of
common English understanding to the language of the Chemical
Weapons Convention in Bond 103 might seem particularly worrisome.
But this may not be the best interpretation of these decisions. In
other treaty interpretation cases during this period, particularly ones
concerning the Hague Convention, the Court actually seems to be
embracing international standards of treaty interpretation like those
in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 104 The better
reading of opinions like BG Group and Bond, I would suggest, is that
the Court is increasingly separating interpretation of the treaty from
interpretation of domestic obligations and, in particular, treaty
interpretation from interpretation of the implementing legislation. 105
And cases that some might suggest should turn on interpretation of
a treaty are instead turning on something else.
Thus in Bond, Chief Justice Roberts distinguishes between the
Chemical Weapons Convention and the implementing legislation,
the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act, even
though the language of the two is almost identical. 106 He then
focuses on the latter, which, as an act of Congress, is subject to
ordinary methods of statutory interpretation, including application
of various presumptions. In this case, the Chief Justice applies a
presumption that Congress intends to keep the normal balance of
federal-state relations unless it clearly states otherwise, 107 finds

102. See Roberts & Trahanas, supra note 79, at 755.
103. Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2088, 2090 (noting that “it is appropriate to refer to basic
principles of federalism embodied in the Constitution to resolve ambiguity in a federal
statute,” looking to what an “an ordinary person would associate with instruments of chemical
warfare,” and observing that “an educated user of English would not describe Bond’s crime as
involving a ‘chemical weapon’”).
104. See Roger P. Alford, Bond and the Vienna Rules, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1561,
1566–70 (2015); see also Galbraith, supra note 7, at 1511–12 (noting the convergence
between the Court’s approach and international rules, but suggesting that it is more “likely
one rooted in common imperatives . . . than in direct causal ties”).
105. Although they are related and moving in parallel, this trend is distinct from the one
away from deference. The Court sometimes uses one, sometimes the other, and sometimes
both in the same decision. The Court seems to be experimenting with techniques of
interpretative control, rather than adopting a single coherent methodology.
106. Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2088.
107. Id. at 2089–90.
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ambiguity in the term “chemical weapons,” 108 and thus determines
the statute should not be understood to cover Carol Anne Bond’s
“ordinary” attempted poisoning—a matter usually left to state law. 109
Although Chief Justice Roberts might be inclined to interpret the
Chemical Weapons Convention similarly, 110 the logic is applicable
only to a congressionally-enacted statute.
In BG Group, Justice Breyer uses “ordinary contract” 111
principles to determine whether the U.K.-Argentina BIT’s local
litigation requirement is a question of “arbitrability” (subject to
judicial review) or procedure (left to the arbitrators). 112 This might
seem odd. Why should a treaty between two non-U.S. parties be
interpreted according to U.S. contract law rather than international
treaty law? Buried in the opinion is Justice Breyer’s answer. When
parties appear before U.S. courts to have awards confirmed or
vacated under international arbitration agreements, that process is
governed by an American statute, the Federal Arbitration Act, 113 and
under that Act, the federal court “should normally apply the
presumptions supplied by American law.” 114 It is thus in that unique
posture that the Court interprets the U.K.-Argentina BIT.
Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal also
turns on questions of statutory, rather than treaty, law. 115 The Court
in that case accepts the executive branch’s view that hoasca is
covered by the Convention on Psychotropic Substances. 116
Following principles of U.S. law, however, the Court determines that
U.S. obligations under that treaty are not, in and of themselves,
sufficient justification for denying a religious exception under a U.S.
statute, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. 117 Additionally, in
Negusie v. Holder, the Court avoids interpreting the Refugee
Convention by holding that both the Board of Immigration Appeals

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id. at 2090–91.
Id. at 2091–92.
See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
BG Grp., PLC v. Argentina, 134 S. Ct. 1198, 1206 (2014).
Id. at 1206–07.
Id. at 1205.
Id.
546 U.S. 418, 438 (2006).
Id.
Id.
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and Fifth Circuit incorrectly relied on a prior Supreme Court case. 118
The Court thus bases its decision on a domestic source, Supreme
Court precedent, over which it can claim ultimate
interpretative authority.
This trend of isolating the statutory or constitutional questions
from treaty questions runs in parallel with a trend toward less
deference to the executive on treaty interpretation. By shifting the
question away from areas in which the executive might have special
expertise or a special role towards areas within the Court’s ordinary
bailiwick, the Court essentially removes the executive from the
equation. The executive’s view of a treaty becomes irrelevant.
And Medellín encourages this development. Even if we don’t
read Medellín to establish a presumption against treaty selfexecution, 119 Medellín does increase the uncertainty of whether any
treaty provision will be found to be self-executing. 120 This
uncertainty increases the importance of implementing legislation or
other statutory bases for applying the treaty, which in turn, increases
the interpretative focus on those sources rather than the treaty.
In the end, interpreting the Constitution or statutes, rather than
treaties, allows the Court to consider questions specific to American
law—like federalism or separation of powers—without: (1) doing
damage to the treaty; (2) setting precedents about how the treaty
should be interpreted by other states; and (3) asserting that the
United States is not bound by its obligations. But, the drawback of
this trend is that it drives a wedge between treaty commitment and
compliance; even enacting the treaty’s precise language into law is no
guarantee that the treaty’s obligations will be effective as U.S. law.121
118. 555 U.S. at 522–23. The outliers here are again the Vienna Convention cases.
Although those cases technically involve the International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 42
U.S.C. § 11601, rather than the treaty, the Court has acted as though they are interpreting the
treaty directly. See Galbraith, supra note 7, at 1512.
119. RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES: TREATIES (AM. LAW INST., Preliminary Draft No. 3, 2014).
120. John R. Crook, ed., Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to
International Law, 104 AM. J. INT’L L. 100 (2010) (“Seeking to address uncertainty
regarding the self-executing character of some U.S. treaties following the U.S. Supreme
Court’s decision in Medellín v. Texas, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is acting to
document the Senate’s intentions regarding new treaties.”).
121. See Galbraith, supra note 7, at 1523 (noting the problem with using different
standards to interpret treaties, implementing legislation, and endorsing the opposite view:
“[a]n incorporative statute should be interpreted in light of the underlying treaty”); Edward T.
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IV. WEIGHING “GREAT WEIGHT”
Given the current Roberts Court trends regarding treaties, what
is left of the “great weight” standard? Is the Roberts Court’s
approach an interesting exception or the foundation of a new rule?
Should the Restatement (Fourth) amend or drop the “great
weight” standard?
A. Mixed Messages; Mixed Results
The small sample of Roberts Court treaty cases and the relatively
short period of time make it difficult to assess where things actually
stand. Further complicating matters are the Court’s deliberately
mixed messages: the Court continues to cite deference standards
even as it brushes aside executive branch interpretations. 122 Is the
Court signaling that the standard remains alive, particularly for lower
federal courts—a sort of “listen to what we say, not what we do”
lesson? Is it signaling a change in the meaning or interpretation of
“great weight”? Does “great weight” weigh less than it once did?
And then there is the question of how lower federal courts have
actually responded, particularly as the grand majority of treaty
interpretations cases never reach the Supreme Court. 123
Appendix 1 shows a circuit-by-circuit study of all appellate
decisions interpreting a treaty in which the executive branch has
expressed its view from 2005 through 2014. 124 These results do not
Swaine, Bond’s Breaches, 90 N OTRE DAME L. R EV. 1517, 1518 (2015) (expressing similar
concerns). But see David H. Moore, Treaties and the Presumption Against Preemption,
2015 BYU L. R EV. 1555, 1575–76 (2016) (suggesting such concerns may be overstated
and avoidable).
122. See supra notes 73–74 and accompanying text.
123. Appendix 1, for example, shows thirty-four treaty interpretation cases from the
Courts of Appeals during the Roberts Court era. This is a purposely conservative count.
During that same period, the Supreme Court only heard ten to twelve such cases.
124. To assemble this dataset, research assistants searched the Westlaw database for
federal court decisions going back to 1987, the date of publication for the last Restatement,
using the search query: “(treaty or (international /s convention) or (international /s
agreement)) /p interpret!” It is possible that a few cases may have been missed by the search,
but it unlikely they would have made a difference to the sample. They then coded each case for
(1) the treaty in question, (2) whether the executive branch expressed a view, (3) whether the
court adopted that view, and (4) what standard of deference, if any, the court applied. A
second research assistant and I each re-read the cases and checked the results. Not all decisions
are crystal clear on what they are doing and some borderline cases had to be categorized. We
tried to be conservative in including cases in this final set. For the purposes of this article, only
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necessarily tell us how these courts are receiving the Supreme
Court’s signals or how much deference these courts are actually
giving the executive branch. They are, at best, imperfect proxies. For
one thing, it should take time for any effect of the Roberts Court
opinions to be felt, and the samples get too small the closer we get
to the present to tell us much. Beyond that though, the numbers do
not do a very good job of measuring how much weight or
“deference” is actually given.
Deference, of course, means something different from just
coming out the same way. Deference implies instead that the
executive interpretation is either taking the place of other
interpretative evidence or overruling it. But these cases generally
seem overdetermined. When the courts agree with the executive,
they often cite to other evidence of the treaty’s meaning, which
supports the same view and includes the courts’ own independent
interpretation of the text. 125 This might suggest that deference is not
doing much work. On the flipside, even where courts are truly
deferring, they may want to put their decision on the most solid
ground possible and may want to buttress that deference with other
evidence, obscuring the real role the executive branch’s view played
in the courts’ decision.
All that said, the data shows that the circuit courts are still
adopting the executive’s position the grand majority of the time.
Appendix 1 shows thirty-four circuit court cases involving the
interpretation of a treaty in which the executive expressed a view. 126

Roberts Court-era cases were included. The broader dataset though does not suggest
different patterns.
125. See, e.g., Yaman v. Yaman, 730 F.3d 1, 13, 15 (1st Cir. 2013) (holding that the
drafting history of the Hague Child Abduction Convention and its interpretation by foreign
courts weighed in favor of not applying equitable tolling to a provision of that treaty);
Fulwood v. Fed. Rep. of Ger., 734 F.3d 72, 78 (1st Cir. 2013) (holding that plaintiff’s
interpretation of a bilateral treaty between Germany and the U.S. conflicted with the treaty’s
clear text); De Los Santos Mora v. New York, 524 F.3d 183, 188 (2d Cir. 2008) (rejecting
plaintiff’s interpretation of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations due to the practices
of “other States-parties to the convention” and the treaty’s text); Swarna v. Al-Awadi, 622
F.3d 123, 135 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding that the government’s view of residual immunity in the
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations was, “supported by the Vienna Convention’s
drafting history”).
126. This includes cases in which the executive branch’s view is merely implied, for
example, because it brought the prosecution or started the extradition process on the basis of a
treaty interpretation challenged in the case. The study found many more cases of treaty
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In only four of those did the court reject the view proffered by the
executive branch. 127 The circuit courts have thus agreed with the
executive 88% of the time, a number in line with trends of recent
decades. 128 That said, it remains uncertain exactly what the Courts of
Appeals are doing. The “great weight” standard” is mentioned in
only twelve of the thirty-four cases (or 35% of the time). 129 In one of
those, World Holdings, LLC v. Federal Republic of Germany, 130 the
court rejected the executive branch’s view and in at least one other,
De Los Santos Mora v. New York, 131 the court added its own caveats
to that standard—in that case, a requirement that great weight was
only due when there was a “settled view of the executive under
successive national administrations.” 132 In eleven of the decisions, no
standard of deference is mentioned at all. 133 If the Courts of Appeals
are deferring, they are hardly publicizing that fact, suggesting they
might be, at the very least, uncertain how much deference the
executive really deserves.
B. Toward a Restatement (Fourth)?
So what does this mean for the Restatement (Fourth)? This raises
complicated questions that go to the heart of the restatement
process. Is the goal of the Restatement to simply record where

interpretation where the executive branch expressed no view or where its view was not
recorded in any way. It is possible that the executive branch did express a view in some of the
latter cases and that those should be coded as cases in which the executive’s view was rejected,
but it is unlikely there are many such cases as failure to deal with the executive branch’s view
would likely have led to complaints and calls for rehearing the case. It is also possible that the
executive branch expressed unrecorded views in cases in which the court agreed with it, and
it’s unlikely the executive branch would have complained about its invisibility in those. All in
all, it seems reasonable to work only with those cases in which the executive’s view is
clearly recorded.
127. These cases have a “No” under the “Did court agree with Government?” column
in Appendix 1.
128. See supra notes 29–33 and accompanying text.
129. These cases include the phrase “Great weight” under the “Deference Standard
Applied“ column in Appendix 1.
130. 613 F.3d 1310, 1317 n.11 (2010).
131. 524 F.3d 183 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing United States v. Li, 206 F.3d 56, 60
(1st Cir. 2000)).
132. Id. at 188.
133. These cases include the phrase “Deference not mentioned” under the “Deference
Standard Applied“ column in Appendix 1.
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things stand at publication or is it to make sense of current
developments and channel them into the most positive
possible directions?
If the goal is to simply map where law is, the next Restatement
should at least record the potential move away from great weight
standard, at least in the reporters’ notes. Section 106(5) of the most
recent draft of the Restatement (Fourth) rearticulates the old
standard that “[c]ourts of the United States . . . will ordinarily give
great weight to an interpretation by the executive branch.” 134 The
reporters’ notes though do acknowledge that the court “at times has
declined to follow the interpretation of the executive branch,
sometimes without citing the ‘great weight’ standard.” 135 This is a
step in the right direction, but the eventual, final Restatement
(Fourth) would do well to note that the recent cluster of cases
actually raises doubt about the standard’s continued vibrance.
Beyond the question of deference, the next Restatement should
probably also note the potential differences between implementing
legislation and the treaty itself and choices available to courts to
interpret one or the other.
But reading the two trends together suggests a path toward
progressive development of the U.S. law on treaty interpretation.
Together, these two trends suggest a broader domestication of the
treaty negotiation process, not just a domestication of the question
before the court, but a domestication of the deference due executive
interpretations. In such an integrated treaty practice, treaty
interpretation questions would be, as much as possible, assimilated
into domestic interpretive methods. When possible, the court will
interpret the statute or other domestic authority rather than the
treaty. When not possible, the court will interpret the treaty itself,
using techniques appropriate for an instrument negotiated between
states, but granting the executive no more deference than it would in
statutory interpretation. This would align practice to a large extent
with the suggestion of Ganesh Sitaraman and Ingrid Wuerth that
deference on foreign affairs issues be normalized and assimilated into

134. RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES: TREATIES § 106(5) (AM. LAW INST., Preliminary Draft No. 4, 2015).
135. Id. § 106 reporters’ note 8.
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the broader methods of U.S. law. 136 In many cases, this practice
might mean no deference to the executive branch. In most though,
it might mean something like Skidmore, or persuasiveness deference,
where the executive’s view is valued for its expertise and as a gloss on
other available evidence. In some, where the executive has a
longstanding, well-worked out view of the treaty or provision, one
potentially even at odds with what other nations think, it might be
due something like Chevron deference. This would recognize the
dual role played by the executive in treaty interpretation—on the one
hand, as an administrator of our treaty obligations responsible for
the everyday interpretation of what those treaties require, and on the
other, as negotiator-in-chief, articulating the United States’ views of
the law to and with the rest of the world. In at least some cases, the
executive branch treaty interpretations will themselves be acts of
diplomacy and negotiation. Even then, though, as Sitaraman and
Wuerth suggest, deference would be subject to a similar reasonableness
standard, 137 and the executive should not be granted special deference
in defining the scope of its own powers under a treaty. 138
Whether or not such a “normalization” of treaty interpretation
accurately or fully reflects the current state of the law, normalization
might be the most normatively appealing way to harness the trends
already in effect. Its main advantages are its coherence and relative
clarity. One could make a strong argument that internationalization
would be a more normatively appealing approach. Treaties should be
read as international commitments, the executive’s foreign policy
concerns should be given primacy, implementing legislation should
be read in accordance with international law, and the most important
presumption should be Charming Betsy. 139 Such an approach might
do the best job aligning the United States with its international
commitments. 140 The debate between these two visions cannot be
resolved here. To the extent though that the Court seems to already

136. Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 94.
137. Id. at 1969–70.
138. Id. at 1970.
139. According to the Charming Betsy presumption, “an act of Congress ought never to
be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains.” Murray
v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
140. See Galbraith, supra note 7, at 1523; Swaine, supra note 121, at 1518; John F. Coyle,
Incorporative Statutes and the Borrowed Treaty Rule, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 655, 680 (2010).
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be moving in the direction of normalization or domestication,
reifying that approach can at least clarify the baselines against which
the president, Congress, and the courts are working. The president is
on notice how to argue about treaty interpretation, Congress is on
notice how implementing legislation will be read and how it might
need to be amended, and the courts are on notice where to start
their inquiries. Foreign policy implications and concerns can be
assessed and managed with those baseline understandings in mind.
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s opinion of executive branch treaty
interpretations seems to be in flux. The Roberts Court, at least,
seems uncertain whether executive branch interpretations truly
deserve to be given “great weight” when the Court is asked to
interpret a treaty. But the doubt visible in the Supreme Court’s, and
to a much lesser extent, the circuit court’s treatment of executive
branch treaty interpretations has yet to make it into drafts of the
Restatement (Fourth) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United
States. Nor have the drafts of Restatement (Fourth) noted the
Court’s moves to domesticate treaty interpretations and to
distinguish treaties from implementing legislation. Whether the
reporters agree with these moves or not, they must acknowledge
them. If they do not, there is risk the Restatement (Fourth) could be
outdated before it’s even finalized.
The Court is chipping away at the “great weight” standard. The
reporters for the Restatement (Fourth) of the Foreign Relations Law
of the United States must now decide whether to buttress it or to let
it topple and begin to build a new one.
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Appendix 1: U.S. Courts of Appeals Treaty Interpretation
Deference, 2005−2014

Pierre v. Gonzales

2nd

United States
v. Cuevas

502 F.3d 109

2nd

De Los Santos
Mora v. New
York

496 F.3d 256

9/11/2007

2nd

GuaylupoMoya v.
Gonzales

524 F.3d 183

7/27/2007

2nd

Fulwood v.
Fed. Republic
of Germany
423 F.3d 121

4/24/2008

1st

Yaman v.
Yaman

734 F.3d 72

9/12/2005

1st

Case Name

730 F.3d 1
10/30/2013

Circuit

Citation
9/11/2013

Convention Against
Torture

Decision Date

Yes

Vienna
Convention on
Consular
Relations

Yes

Treaty in
Question

Yes

International
Covenant on
Civil and
Political
Rights;
Convention on
Rights of the
Child

Yes

Certain
Matters Arising
from the
Validation of
German Dollar
Bonds

Yes

Hague
Convention on
the Civil
Aspects of
International
Child
Abduction

Yes

Deference not
mentioned

Extradition
Treaty, June
19, 1909,
U.S.-Dom.
Rep.; UN
Convention
Against Illicit
Traffic in
Narcotic Drugs
and
Psychotropic
Substances

Did court
agree with
Government?

Great weight

Substantial deference;
Respect is ordinarily
due the Executives
reasonable views
Great weight

Deference not
mentioned

Deference
Standard
Applied

to the settled
view of the
Executive
under
successive
i
l
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Deference
Standard
Applied

Did court
agree with
Government?

Treaty in
Question

Decision Date

Citation

Case Name

Circuit

Deference not
mentioned

Yes

Treaty on
Mutual
Assistance in
Criminal
Matters
(MLAT), June
12, 1981,
U.S.-Neth.

11/5/2007

506 F.3d 108

United States
v. Rommy

2nd

Respect is
ordinarily due
the Executive’s
reasonable views

No

Third and
Fourth Geneva
Conventions of
1949

9/22/2008

543 F.3d 59

ACLU v. DOD

2nd

Deference not
mentioned

No

Serbian
Extradition
Treaty

12/9/2009

589 F.3d 52

Sacirbey v.
Guccione

2nd

Great weight

Yes

Convention on
Privileges and
Immunities of
the United
Nations

3/2/2010

597 F.3d 107

Brzak v. UN

2nd

Great weight

Yes

Vienna
Convention on
Consular
Relations

9/25/2014

622 F.3d 123

Swarna v. AlAwadi

2nd

Deference not
mentioned

Yes

United Nations
Charter

10/27/2012

662 F.3d 610

United States
v. Bahel

2nd

Great weight

Yes

Hague
Convention on
the Civil
Aspects of
International
Child
Abduction

10/1/2012

697 F.3d 41

Lozano v.
Alvarez

2nd
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Fund for
Animals v.
Kempthorne
540 F.3d 165

Rranci v. AG of
the United
States

2/22/2007

478 F.3d 588

Ordinola v.
Hackman

Extradition
Treaty between
the United
States and the
United
Mexican States

12/16/2014

774 F.3d 207

Zhenli Ye Gon
v. Holt

Yes

Hague
Convention on
the Civil
Aspects of
International
Child
Abduction

8/1/2014

761 F.3d 495

Sanchez v.
R.G.L. ex rel
Hernandez

5th

Hoxha v. Levi

538 F.3d 124

8/22/2008

Extradition
Treaty between
the United
States and Peru

Yes

Great weight

4th

Doe v. Holder

465 F.3d 554
8/14/2008

Convention
Against
Torture,
Convention
Against
Transnational
Organized
Crime

Yes

Substantial
deference

4th

Case Name

763 F.3d 251
10/3/2006

Convention
between the
United States
of America and
the United
Mexican States
for the
Protection of
Migratory
Birds and
Game
Mammals

No

Great weight

3rd

Citation
8/19/2014

US-Albanian
Extradition
Treaty;
Convention
Against
Torture

Yes

Deference not
mentioned

3rd

Decision Date

United Nations
Convention
Against
Transnational
Organized
Crime

Yes

Respect is
ordinarily due;
Great weight

3rd

Treaty in
Question

Yes

Defers because
Political
Question

2nd

Did court
agree with
Government?

Great weight

Circuit

Deference
Standard
Applied
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11th
11th

11th

World
Holdings, LLC
v. Federal
Republic of
Germany

11th

11th

Gandara v.
Bennett

613 F.3d 1310

10th

Baran v. Beaty

528 F.3d 823

7th

United States
v. Rodriguez

526 F.3d 1340

Circuit

162 F. App’x 853

8/9/2010

Niang v.
Gonzales

432 F.3d 1292

5/22/2008

Jogi v. Voges

422 F. 3d 1187

5/9/2008

Case Name

480 F.3d 822

1/4/2006

Maharaj v.
Secretary for
Dept. of
Corrections

Citation
12/15/2005

Agreement
Between the
United States of
America and the
Federal
Republic of
Germany
Regarding
Certain Matters
Arising from the
Validation of
German Dollar
Bonds (the
“1953 Treaty”)

9/8/2005

Vienna
Convention on
Consular
Relations

No

3/13/2011

Yes

Great weight,
but exception

Decision Date

Yes

Great Weight

Vienna
Convention on
Consular
Relations

Yes

Entitled to
Deference

Vienna
Convention on
Consular
Relations

Yes

Entitled to
Deference

Convention
Against
Torture

Yes

Some
Deference

Vienna
Convention on
Consular
Relations

Yes

Substantial
Deference

Treaty in
Question

Did court
agree with
Government?

Found support
in
Government’s
position

Hague
Convention on
the Civil
Aspects of
International
Child
Abduction

Deference
Standard
Applied
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McKesson
Corp. v.
Islamic
Republic of
Iran

707 F.3d 299

Earle v. District
of Columbia

9/15/2007

499 F.3d 1310

DeArchibold v.
United States

Federal Circuit

Bennett v.
Islamic
Republic of
Iran
672 F.3d 1066

12/28/2012

Panama Canal
Treaty

D.C.

Haver v. C.I.R.

618 F.3d 19

2/28/2012

Vienna
Convention on
Consular
Relations

Yes

D.C.

444 F.3d 656
9/10/2010

Treaty of
Amity,
Economic
Relations, and
Consular
Rights, U.S.–
Iran

Yes

Deference not
mentioned

D.C.

694 F.3d 1223
4/12/2007

Vienna
Convention on
Diplomatic
Relations

Yes

Great weight

D.C.

Citation
9/11/2012
Convention
Between the
United States
of America and
the Federal
Republic of
Germany for
the Avoidance
of Double
Taxation

Yes

Deference not
mentioned

11th

Decision Date

Mutual Legal
Assistance
Treaty
(MLAT)
between
Thailand and
the United

Yes

Deference not
mentioned

Circuit

Treaty in
Question

Yes

Deference not
mentioned

United States
v. Duboc

Did court
agree with
Government?

Deference not
mentioned

Case Name

Deference
Standard
Applied
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